In their seminal 𝘔𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘐𝘯𝘯𝘰𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘸𝘢𝘳 𝘗𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘰𝘥, Murray & Millett compiled lessons which map directly onto today’s defense and dual-use landscape.
Their core insight was straightforward: militaries don’t fail for lack of technology; they fail for lack of imagination, integration, and institutional courage.
And that pattern is visible again in Ukraine and in China’s accelerating military modernization.
1. Most militaries have the technology — few rethink how to use it
Interwar armies all had tanks and radios; only a handful built new operational concepts around them. Today, Ukraine started winning tactical advantages with cheap, rapidly evolving drones and battlefield software, and Russia has developed similar tools and the means and imagination to adapt.
2. The winners integrated new technologies into new concepts — not old doctrine
The U.S. Navy’s carrier aviation and Germany’s blitzkrieg and weren’t platform breakthroughs, they were doctrinal concept breakthroughs. Today, China’s force design — spanning hypersonics, counter-space, and integrated C2 — aims to leapfrog Western doctrine rather than mirror it.
3. Innovation requires champions with institutional cover
Interwar reformers succeeded only when senior leaders protected them. Today, Ukraine elevates officers who experiment; China backs internal innovators with political alignment.
❓ These conclusions leads to a set of questions:
For founders: Does your technology fit into an emerging operational concept, or is it trying to bolt onto structures that won’t survive the next decade?
For investors: Are we backing startups that change the way missions are executed, not just add another point solution?
‼️ The takeaway
The biggest opportunity in defense and dual-use technology isn’t another sensor, drone, or autonomy stack. Instead, it is enabling the conceptual and organizational shift that modern conflict now demands.
As investors, we look for startups that enable rapid adaptation on the battlefield, align with emergent operational doctrinal concepts, and have customers inside DoD with the authority to champion change.
1. Most militaries have the technology — few rethink how to use it
Interwar armies all had tanks and radios; only a handful built new operational concepts around them. Today, Ukraine started winning tactical advantages with cheap, rapidly evolving drones and battlefield software, and Russia has developed similar tools and the means and imagination to adapt.
2. The winners integrated new technologies into new concepts — not old doctrine
The U.S. Navy’s carrier aviation and Germany’s blitzkrieg and weren’t platform breakthroughs, they were doctrinal concept breakthroughs. Today, China’s force design — spanning hypersonics, counter-space, and integrated C2 — aims to leapfrog Western doctrine rather than mirror it.
3. Innovation requires champions with institutional cover
Interwar reformers succeeded only when senior leaders protected them. Today, Ukraine elevates officers who experiment; China backs internal innovators with political alignment.
❓ These conclusions leads to a set of questions:
For founders: Does your technology fit into an emerging operational concept, or is it trying to bolt onto structures that won’t survive the next decade?
For investors: Are we backing startups that change the way missions are executed, not just add another point solution?
‼️ The takeaway
The biggest opportunity in defense and dual-use technology isn’t another sensor, drone, or autonomy stack. Instead, it is enabling the conceptual and organizational shift that modern conflict now demands.
As investors, we look for startups that enable rapid adaptation on the battlefield, align with emergent operational doctrinal concepts, and have customers inside DoD with the authority to champion change.
The interwar period showed what happens when innovation outpaces institutions. Ukraine and China show it’s happening again.
A version of this post was published on LinkedIn in December 2025
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