Tuesday, March 24, 2026

Robotics Is Not About Robots

Co-authored by Oana Olteanu of Motive Force

 

Henry Ford’s Rouge, source

A robot running at 95% accuracy sounds impressive. In a factory running fifty cycles an hour, that means fifty failures every shift. Each one requires a human to intervene, log the incident, reset the system, and decide what happens next. The robot is working. The deployment isn't.

This is the gap that ends most robotics companies. Not the hardware. Not the vision model. Not the manipulation benchmark. The system around the robot.

We have been spending time with founders and engineers working in physical AI, and the same failure mode keeps surfacing. The robotics conversation is almost entirely about the machine: better models, better form factors, better demos. The deployment conversation barely exists. And almost nothing in the stack was built for what comes after the demo.

Physical AI is not a robot problem. It's a skills, workflows, and learning system problem.

The hierarchy nobody draws

At its core, a robot is just an embodiment: joints, sensors, actuators. The real abstraction sits above the machine.

Physical work can be structured as a hierarchy: scenarios decompose into skills, skills into tasks, tasks into trajectories. This defines how complex industrial processes become machine-executable actions. It is also, not coincidentally, how enterprise software has always modeled work. The systems we worked on at SAP were built on exactly this kind of decomposition. What's different now is that AI can learn the levels of this hierarchy, not just execute against a fixed specification.

The primary challenge is therefore not the robot. It's the toolchain that lets robots learn, operate, and improve: simulation environments, workflow models, perception and planning stacks, data pipelines, the software that converts human demonstrations into reusable skills. This is the infrastructure that lets automation move beyond isolated machines toward scalable systems.

Hardware is a data acquisition device

Here is the reframe that matters for thinking about where value accumulates.

Robots increasingly function as data acquisition devices. Each deployment generates operational telemetry and demonstrations that feed back into learning systems. Over time, those feedback loops produce skill libraries, workflow abstractions, and training datasets that let automation capabilities transfer across tasks, sites, and embodiments.

This is why many of the most interesting robotics founders are not primarily designing new machines. They are building learning systems that combine simulation, real-world telemetry, and human motion data to continuously improve performance across fleets. The compounding advantage is in the accumulation of operational data and the ability to convert it into reusable automation capabilities.

One idea we keep coming back to from several conversations: the intelligence doesn't have to live inside the robot. One architecture inverts the assumption entirely: the brains are in the environment, and the robot is just a tool the physical model uses to act on the world. That inversion changes the cost structure, the upgrade path, and the distribution model. It also makes the robot itself much cheaper, which is the actual bottleneck for adoption in most markets.

The deployment gap is real, and it's not about the model

The pattern is consistent: great demos, almost no real deployments. And when companies do deploy, they hit a different set of problems than they expected.

Integration with existing operations. Financing and asset lifecycle. Service networks. Change management. Human workflow alignment. These are not engineering problems. They are adoption problems, and almost nothing in the robotics stack was built to solve them.

The deployment stack is where most robotics companies die: not on the benchmark, but on the installation. Nobody can plug the robot into the existing ticketing system. Nobody has figured out how to triage a failure at 2 am. The operator doesn't know when to trust it and when to override. And the vendor who sold the hardware has no infrastructure to help.

This is the tank problem. Germany built the most complex and complicated tanks in the second world war but lacked scale everywhere. The Soviet Army built the most tanks of all, but they were designed as disposable items. The United States built simpler tanks at scale with a massive supply chain and service network.

Robotics is still in the beautiful tank era. The market winners will build the whole logistics network.

Berlin, summer 2024. Research.

The agent runtime is the missing layer

There is something happening in the software stack that will define which robotics companies matter in the next few years, and it is barely being discussed.

The architecture of a capable physical AI system is, at its core, two things: the model and the agent runtime. The models are getting better and everyone is paying attention to that. The agent runtimes are almost invisible in the conversation, and yet the performance of the whole system is insanely dependent on them.

An agent runtime for physical AI has to do things that software has never had to do before. Operate continuously, not just on demand. Manage asynchronous input from the physical world. Reason about state across long time horizons. Coordinate between multiple agents pursuing different objectives in the same physical space. Log decisions in a way that's legible to humans who need to understand what happened and why.

This is not a solved problem. What most people are building today are either model wrappers or task-specific automation. Neither is infrastructure for continuous physical operation. Neither was designed for a world where the agent is running, the robot is acting, and a human somewhere needs to understand and trust all of it.

The companies building the agent runtime layer for physical AI don't have a clean category name yet. That's usually the right sign.

Where value actually accrues

Selling a robot is a capex transaction. Scaling automation requires owning the workflow layer: the point where robotic skills integrate with customer operations, business processes, and human workflows.

That layer determines adoption. It determines utilization. It determines whether a company accumulates the operational data that makes the next deployment better than the last one. And it determines whether, when a customer's processes change, the automation changes with them or breaks.

The companies that define this market won't necessarily be those that build the most sophisticated machines. They will be those that develop the most effective learning and workflow systems around machines. The robot is the vessel. The system is the product.

What we’re looking for

The category map writes itself. Simulation and training infrastructure. Workflow modeling tools. Agent runtimes for continuous physical operation. Incident management and operational orchestration. Context layers for physical assets. End-to-end deployment platforms that treat automation as a service, not a product.

None of these require building the robot. All of them are more defensible than the robot.

We’re looking for founders who see physical AI as a systems problem, not a hardware problem. Who understand workflows and operations, not just models and sensors. Who think in hierarchies: what is the scenario, what are the skills, what are the tasks, what are the trajectories, and how does learning flow back up through all of them.

If you're building in this layer, or working in physical environments where you've felt the deployment gap firsthand, we’d genuinely like to talk. 

—--

About Motive Force: We back technical founders at the idea stage, before the category has a name. If that's you, reach out.

About Christian Dahlen: angel investor with investments in robotics and industrial software and a Ph. D. in engineering. Select investments include Wandelbots, deltia.ai, and SDA.

Thursday, March 19, 2026

What I look for in robotics founders

I have met with dozens if not hundreds of robotics startups who want to build for industrial operations.



This is what I look for in the founding teams:

  • Factory native founders who understand real operations.
    People who have lived uptime, OEE, and production pressure, not just built robots in labs.


  • Founders who are deployment-obsessed, focused on install time, integration with PLC/MES systems, safety, and reliability.
    Not demos or model benchmarks.


  • Founders think in workflows, not robots.
    They define the manual process, redesign it for automation, and treat the robot as just one component in a broader system.


  • Founders who can clearly articulate ROI.
    Cost per hour, payback period, uptime assumptions, and why this beats human labor or existing automation.


  • Founders with a strong bias for simplicity.
    Deliberately reducing complexity, constraining environments, and standardizing tasks to make systems reliable and scalable.


  • Hybrid teams combining software/data capability, industrial experience, and hands-on deployment experience.
    Not just pure roboticists.


  • Founders who think in fleets and learning loops, understanding that value compounds through data, iteration, and scaling across many deployments.

👉 Bottom line: 

  • Founders building industrial-grade systems that deploy, work, and scale.
    Not impressive robots.

Factory to robotics startup: Forget the humanoid; build the System.

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal about Agility humanoids at Schaeffler ("When Humanoid Robots Come to a Small-Town Factory") and a Techcrunch interview with Rivian's R J Scaringe ("... we're doing robots all wrong") provided interesting insights into the state of the so called humanoids in factory environments today.   




Industrial environments are the ideal testing grounds for robotics because they are predictable and well-bounded. Early deployments are already happening at entry points such as material handling and logistics where dexterous manipulation is not required.

For these use cases, t
he economics of robotic labor are closing in on human labor costs.

What works today is simple, constrained, and supervised. What is not working is trying to solve everything at once and over-engineered, complex systems aren't scaling. The bottleneck isn't the AI, it's everything around it. Safety in human-shared environments, integration efforts, and day-to-day reliability are gating adoption. 

The hardest problem, dexterous manipulation, remains largely unsolved, and the most capable-looking robots are often the least deployable ones.

The solution is a better system and not a better robot. The winners own the workflows, the deployment infrastructure, and the manipulation layer that ties hardware and software to real operations. Semi-humanoid and non-humanoid form factors that fit cleanly into existing industrial environments will outperform impressive general purpose machines that can't clear the integration bar. As uptime improves and costs continue to decline, what looks today like augmentation will segue into substitution.

The transition will be won by industrial-grade systems built for operations, not by the most compelling demo. 

The Industrialization of Low Earth Orbit: Beyond Collision Avoidance

When SpaceX unveiled its Stargaze Space Situational Awareness (SSA) system last month, the positioning was largely as a collision avoidance feature. However, the architectural implications point to a more profound shift from passive tracking to active Space Traffic Management (STM).


Credit: SpaceX

As mega-constellations scale toward tens of thousands of assets, the "manual" era of satellite operations has reached its functional limit. The industry is now moving toward automated governance, characterized by two critical requirements:


👉 Autonomy at Scale: With hundreds of thousands of collision avoidance maneuvers already occurring annually, operators can no longer rely on human-in-the-loop systems. The future belongs to automated conjunction analysis and predictive orbit modeling.


👉 Data Aggregation over silos: Reliable threat identification and maneuver detection require a unified "single source of truth." Orbital intelligence can no longer exist in proprietary silos if we are to mitigate systemic risk.


Stargaze is the first evidence of this new reality at scale: a move toward a sophisticated, automated architecture for the orbital commons.

Saturday, February 28, 2026

How a board should govern innovation it cannot predict (6/6)

Supervisory boards are designed to control risk, ensure accountability, and protect long term value. That logic works well for established businesses whose performance can be forecast and audited, the typical public company or private equity owned shop. 





Transformation initiatives are different. Their outcomes cannot be predicted, only managed probabilistically. 


When both activities are governed identically, boards unintentionally force management to either hide uncertainty or avoid it. Core governance expects reliable plans, budget adherence, and variance explanations. Venture activity produces evolving plans, changing strategy, and learning instead of predictability. So management adapts and presents exploration as execution which leads to late surprises, sudden write-offs, loss of trust. 


A board should never approve innovation projects. They cannot evaluate uncertain outcomes. Instead, they can evaluate whether uncertainty is being reduced responsibly and should ensure capital exposure is bounded, learning velocity is high, and escalation rules are clear. 


A board should only oversee three things:

  1. Portfolio exposure
    How much capital is at risk simultaneously

  2. Funding discipline
    Continuation only after evidence

  3. Separation of logic
    Exploration metrics that are not mixed with operational KPIs

Board should never ever select ideas, approve technical directions, demand detailed forecasts, integrate ventures prematurely. These actions destroy optionality. 

But when governed correctly, downside is limited, upside remains uncapped, and management credibility increases. Transformation becomes auditable without becoming a foregone conclusion. 


No industrial company fails to transform because they lack ideas, talent, or technology. 

They fail because they apply operational governance to exploratory activities. 

Once the board governs uncertainty instead of trying to eliminate it, transformation stops being a gamble and becomes a managed asset class. 




Why industrial startups don't scale like software, and why that matters for corporate strategy (5/6)

Over the last decade, industrial companies have tried to adopt startup methods like agile teams, MVPs, incubator and venture units with the expectation that small teams could rapidly build scalable businesses, just like in software. Yet most industrial digital initiatives plateaued in the same place where successful pilots never became large businesses. The explanation is usually organizational. But the pattern is too consistent to be cultural. 




In SaaS, the sequence was to build product, find users, scale distribution and optimize economics. In industrial systems the sequence is to prove technical reliability in reality, integrate into operations, earn organization trust, and scale commercially. Applying the former to the latter leads to the stereotypical "pilot purgatory', and the product market fit only comes later. 


The Lean Startup thinking has popularized the concept of a minimum viable product. And in fact, the advent of LLMs, vibe coding and agents have made building software MVPs easier than ever. But an industrial MVP still requires safety acceptance, workflow integration, downtime risk, and operator trust. Learning cycles are constrained by operations, not coding speed and the experimentation bandwidth massively narrows. As opposed to software which scales with distribution, industrial solutions scale with deployment capacity from integrators, commissioning, change management, training, and liability acceptance.
Therefore growth is stepwise, not exponential.


Because risk reduces differently in industrial systems, stage gates must evaluate different evidence. Early stages must mitigate technical and operational risk, later stages market and commercial risk. 


Industrial transformation will not be driven by apps on top of factories. It will instead be driven by systems that cross the boundary between software and operations. And the highest value companies in the next industrial cycle will control operational feedback loops, not dashboards. 


Next article (6/6)

Board governance for industrial transformation - managing two business models inside one company.



How to run a corporate venture portfolio without becoming a venture capital firm (4/6)

Operational companies run on annual planning cycles. 

Venture building runs on learning cycles. 

Trying to manage the second with the first results in one of two predictable outcomes. Either the initiatives are frozen by planning, or they run outside governance entirely. 




The solution does not lie in creating a new department, but in implementing a different decision cadence that funds increasingly expensive questions

  1. Technical feasibility

  2. Real customer usage (-> viability)

  3. Repeatable deployment (-> product market fit)

  4. Scalable economics
Funding should not be a commitment to success belief, but a purchase of evidence. Capital should only be provided when uncertainty decreases. 


Most companies have steering committees, project reviews, and budget committees to evaluation progress against plan. In contrast, a venture forum evaluates risk versus evidence and is characterized as follows

  • Frequent meetings (6-10 weeks)

  • Very small group 

  • Authority to stop initiatives

  • No project ownership

  • Compares initiatives against each other

This forum manages allocations, not execution. It is making kill decisions based on transparent stop conditions: 

  • No repeatable customer usage

  • No technical feasibility

  • No economic faith
Because the conditions are agreed beforehand, stopping is not political. And the organization can celebrate disciplined termination more than heroic persistence. 


This requires a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities. Leadership controls the funding continuation, the strategic direction, and the portfolio size. The teams control the solution, the iterations and the learning speed. Corporate burden is reduced and outcomes are improved. 

The role of the executive changes from approving projects to continuously reallocating capital. 


All of this may sound like software venture building, but industrial initiatives behave differently:

  • hardware dependencies

  • pilot purgatory

  • deployment friction

  • long validation cycles

and so the operating model must adapt. 


Next article (5/6)

Why industrial ventures are structurally different from software - and why most corporate playbooks fail here